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Only the closest reasoning and the most detailed attention to the arguments and evidence of a
massive, painstakingly documented, ambitiously revisionist history would justify the harsh
rhetoric in Steve Bickerstaff’s three-and-a-half-page attack on my Article[1]:  “Very little” is new
in my “retelling” of the passage and renewals of the Voting Rights Act, he asserts, and my
“rehash” of Supreme Court decisions is even “less effective.”  My “unannounced agenda . . .
slants the discussion and detracts from the credibility of [the Article’s] scholarship.”[2]  I
“unfairly denigrate[ ]” the “many complex and comprehensive” histories of Section 5, and my
history lacks “thoroughness and objectivity.”[3]  But rather than responding to the specifics of
my Article and argument, Bickerstaff offers only unsubstantiated assertions and confused and
often incorrect capsule summaries of case law.
The terms “retelling” and “rehash” serve merely to disparage; they could be applied to eminent
historians like Thucydides, Gibbon, or Woodward, as easily as to me.    Bickerstaff never reveals
my ominous “political agenda” or points out my disturbing “slants”—charges that are damning to
me if true, but damning to him if not sustained, and even more damning if left too vague to be
evaluated or even potentially countered.  His disagreements with my analyses of particular
judicial decisions are never spelled out; he just asserts a general contrary position and accuses me
of bias for not agreeing with him.  Instead of addressing my criticisms of specific cases, he treats
those criticisms as condemnations of the lifetime corpuses of decisions and silent concurrences
of particular justices.  He reduces the force of his charge that my Article is not thorough by
asserting that “a fair critical analysis of all of these cases in a single law-review article is
impossible,”[4] thus indicting me for failing to accomplish a task that he believes impossible to
achieve.  As the extensive references in my Article make clear, I draw on many interesting and
useful papers and policy studies that analyze parts of that history, and I criticize others.  My
criticisms are directed at particular aspects of particular studies, which I identify.[5]  Bickerstaff
never specifically defends any of them, never examines any of them—indeed, he never even cites
a single treatment of more than a tiny fragment of the history of Section 5, a curious oversight if
“many complex and comprehensive” histories in fact exist.  In fact, they do not, and Bickerstaff
ignores general patterns that I point out in the history of Section 5, patterns that are the prime
focus of my paper, as well the light that those patterns shed on individual events that have
previously been examined in temporal and topical isolation.
 
In the only examples he proffers of what he asserts is my “unbalanced”[6] scholarship,
Bickerstaff condemns my analysis of Supreme Court opinions by Justices Potter Stewart and
Sandra Day O’Connor as flawed by “a particular political slant or agenda.”[7]  Lumping together
opinions that they wrote or merely joined over decades,[8] Bickerstaff never considers their
reasoning or the facts of individual cases, though he skewers me for failing to “look[ ]
meaningfully at the reasoning given by the Justices for their opinions.”[9]  Repeatedly
mischaracterizing my positions and never once examining my reasoning or the evidence I adduce
to support it, Bickerstaff also undermines his indictment by making factual errors and sweeping
conclusions offered without any justification whatsoever.
I nowhere portrayed Justices Stewart and O’Connor “as foes of the Voting Rights Act”[10] per se
even when, as in my discussions of Beer and Bossier I, I criticized their interpretations of the
Act.[11]  I never stated that Justice Stewart implied that Sections 2 and 5 of the Act were
unconstitutional, only that he held in Mobile v. Bolden[12] that proof of discriminatory intent
was required under the Constitution to show any violation of the Act.[13]  I never charged that
Justice Stewart “disregarded the text of Section 5 and sidestepped Supreme Court precedents” in
Bolden or City of Rome, only that he did so in Beer, where he effectively inserted “retrogressive”
before “effect” in reading the law and ignored explicit, contrary language in the Court’s original
reading of the VRA in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.[14]  Far from explaining Justice Stewart’s
opinion in Beer, the Justice’s silent joining of the majority opinion in White v. Regester, as I
point out in my Article, was inconsistent with it, as his silent assent in Allen v. State Board of
Elections[15] was inconsistent with his plurality opinion in Bolden.[16]  And Bickerstaff errs in
touting Justice Stewart as the source of the “elect” language favored by civil rights forces in the
congressional consideration of the VRARA in 2006, because that phrase originated in minority
voting rights in White v. Regester, a case that Bickerstaff condemns me for undervaluing, three
years before Beer.[17]
When he turns to Justice O’Connor’s jurisprudence, Bickerstaff charges that I believe that the
Justice was a consistent “foe of minority political rights” and simply disagrees, concluding,
without examining any opinions at all, that the voting rights majority of which O’Connor was
usually a part from 1993 to 2000 only wanted to protect the VRA from being ruled
unconstitutional, not to “hamper minority voting rights.”[18]  In fact, like Justice Stewart, Justice
O’Connor was inconsistent.  She concurred in Justice White’s opinion in Rogers v. Lodge,[19]
her first voting rights case, which effectively overturned Justice Stewart’s plurality opinion in
Bolden.  She arguably upheld minority voting rights in her detailed and politically sensitive
opinion in Georgia v. Ashcroft,[20] her last voting rights opinion.  In between, she acted
inconsistently, fulfilling her role as the swing justice on the Rehnquist Court.  In particular, in my
Article, I criticized O’Connor’s opinions in Shaw v. Reno[21] and Bossier I in some detail, and I
devoted much more attention to the aspects of Shaw that were not concerned with Section 5 in
Colorblind Injustice, a book I cite repeatedly in the Article.[22]  I am hardly alone in believing
that Shaw, Miller, and the Bossier cases adversely affected minority voting rights.  The ACLU,
the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, MALDEF, the NAACP-LDF, and other
minority group organizations spent much time and money opposing them and their progeny, and
Congress voted nearly unanimously for the “Bossier II fix” in 2006.  Did the whole Congress,
Republicans, as well as Democrats, share the same “political bias” as I do?
 
In my Article and in Colorblind Injustice, I present hundreds of pages of close and detailed
readings of judicial opinions, of their consistencies and inconsistencies with each other and with
the facts of each case, of their fulfillment of or deviation from the intentions of the framers of the
Constitution and the VRA, of their interactions with administrative and legislative actions, and of
their consequences for the continuing struggle against discrimination.  Bickerstaff skips over
such pedestrian tasks and leaps immediately to conclusions, condemning me for some
unspecified political bias because I do not share his interpretation, which he does not deign to
justify.  He leaves readers with the choice between diligent research and empty rhetoric.         
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